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Essay
LAWYER ADVICE AND CLIENT AUTONOMY:
MRS. JONES'S CASE
WILLIAM

H.

SIMON*

INTRODUCTION

In one influential view, the lawyer's most basic function is to
enhance the autonomy of the client. The lawyer does this by providing the information that maximizes the client's understanding of his
situation and minimizes the influence of the lawyer's personal views.
This autonomy or "informed consent" view is often contrasted
with a paternalist or "best interest" view most strongly associated
with official decisions about children and the mentally disabled.
Here the professional's role is to make decisions for the client based
on the professional's view of the client's interests.'
I am going to argue against the autonomy view that any plausible conception of good practice will often require lawyers to make
judgments about clients' best interests and to influence clients to
adopt those judgments. The argument, however, does not amount
to an embrace of paternalism. The issue of paternalism remains
moot until we can clearly distinguish a judgment that a client choice
is autonomous from a judgment that a choice is in the client's best
interests, and my argument is that in practice we often cannot make
such distinctions. The argument takes the form of an illustration
from my own experience followed by an analysis of it.
* Professor of Law, Stanford University. This Essay was given as the Stuart Rome
Lecture at the University of Maryland School of Law on May 3, 1990. Short as it is, the
Essay reflects a lot of advice, especially from David Luban, Lucie White, Jerry L6pez,
Michael Wald, Bill Hing, Mar Matsuda, Deborah Rhode, and David Rosenhan.
1. The autonomy view dominates the academic literature. See, e.g., D. BINDER & S.
A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977);
Ellmann, Lauryers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717 (1987); Spiegel, Lawyering and Client
Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PENN. L. REV. 41 (1979).
However, the paternalist view has been defended in contexts involving ordinary (adult,
nondisabled) clients. Kennedy, Distributive and PaternalisticMotives in Contract and Tort
Law, With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and UnequalBargainingPower, 41 MD. L. REV.
563 (1982); Luban, Paternalismand the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 454. Both views
seem well represented among practitioners. See H. O'GORMAN, LAWYERS AND MATRIMONIAL CASES 163-64 (1963) (small survey of divorce lawyers suggests their role conceptions divide more or less evenly between autonomy and paternalist views).
PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING:
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I.
The only criminal case I ever handled involved defending a woman who worked as a housekeeper for the senior partner in the firm
where I worked. The client, Mrs. Jones, was charged with leaving
the scene of a minor traffic accident without stopping to identify
herself.
According to her, she had stopped to identify herself; it was the
other driver-the complainant-who had both caused the accident
by hitting her car in the rear and who had left the scene without
stopping. The other driver then called the police and reported Mrs.
Jones as leaving the scene.
Mrs. Jones was black; the other driver was white. The police,
without investigation, had taken the other driver's word for what
had happened, and when Mrs. Jones came down to the station at
their insistence, they reprimanded her like a child, addressing hera sixty-five-year old woman-by her first name while referring to the
much-younger complainant as "Mrs. Strelski."
Mrs. Jones lived near Boston in a lower middle class black
neighborhood with a history going back to the Civil War. She was a
homeowner, a church-goer, and a well known and respected member of the community. This was her first brush with the police in her
sixty-five years. Nervous and upset as her experience had made her,
she was obviously a charming person. As far as I was concerned, her
credibility was off the charts.
Moreover, I had a photograph of her car showing a dent and a
paint chip of the color of the other driver's car in the rear-just
where she said the other driver had struck her. When we got to the
courthouse, we located the other car in the parking lot, found the
dent and a paint chip of the color of my client's car in the front, and
I took a Polaroid picture of that.
The case seemed strong, and the misdemeanor procedure gave
us two bites at the apple. First, there would be a bench trial. If we
lost that, we were entitled to claim a trial de novo before a jury.
Thus, things looked fairly good. Mrs. Jones's main problem
was that her lawyer-me-was incompetent. I had never tried a case
and had never done any criminal work. But I tried to remedy that by
getting a friend with a lot of experience in traffic cases to co-counsel
with me. The first thing my friend did was to dismiss, with a roll of
his eyes, my plan to expose the police's racism through devastating
cross-examination. The judge and the police were repeat players in
this process who shared many common interests, he told me. We
could never get a dismissal on a challenge to prosecutorial discre-
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tion, and if an acquittal would imply a finding of racism against the
police, it would be all that harder for the judge to give one. The
second thing my friend did was to start negotiation with the prosecutor, which he told me was the way nearly all such cases were resolved. He told the prosecutor some of the strengths of our case
and showed him my photographs, but he didn't say a word about
racism.
The prosecutor made the following offer. We would enter a
plea of, in effect, nolo contendere. Under the applicable procedure,
this, if accepted by the judge, would guarantee a disposition of, in
effect, six months probation. Mrs. Jones would have a criminal record, but because it would be a first offense, she could apply to have
it sealed after a year.
We considered the advantages: It would spare her the anxiety
of a trial and of having to testify. In the unlikely but possible event
that we lost this trial, the plea bargain would have spared her six
further months of anxious waiting, and the anxiety of a second trial.
In the even more unlikely but still possible event that we lost both
trials, it would have spared her certain loss of her driver's license, a
probably modest fine, and a highly unlikely but theoretically possible jail term of up to six months.
What was the downside? I couldn't say for sure that the criminal record Mrs. Jones would have for at least a year wouldn't adversely affect her in some concrete way, but I doubted it. (She was
living primarily on Social Security and worked only part-time as a
housekeeper.) What bothered me was that the plea bargain would
deprive her of any sense of vindication. Mrs. Jones struck me as a
person who prized her dignity, deeply resented her recent abuse,
and would attach importance to vindication.
Mrs. Jones had brought her minister to the courthouse to support her and serve as a character witness. Leaving my friend with
the prosecutor, I went over to her and the minister to discuss the
plea bargain. I spoke to them for about ten minutes. For about half
this time, we argued about whether I would tell her what I thought
she should do. She and her minister wanted me to. "You're the
expert. That's what we come to lawyers for," they said. I insisted
that, because the decision was hers, I couldn't tell her what to do. I
then spelled out the pros and cons, much as I've mentioned them
here. However, I mentioned the cons last, and the last thing I said
was, "If you took their offer, there probably wouldn't be any bad
practical consequences, but it wouldn't be total justice." Up to that
point, Mrs. Jones and her minister seemed anxiously ambivalent,
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but that last phrase seemed to have a dramatic effect on them. In
unison, they said, "We want justice."
I went back to my friend and said, "No deal. She wants justice."
My friend stared in disbelief and then said, "What? Let me talk to
her." He then proceeded to give her his advice. He didn't tell her
what he thought she should do, and he went over the same considerations I did. The main differences in his presentation were that he
discussed the disadvantages of trial last, while I had gone over them
first; he described the remote possibility of jail in slightly more detail than I had, and he didn't conclude by saying, "It wouldn't be
total justice." At the end of his presentation, Mrs. Jones and her
minister decided to accept the plea bargain, and as I said nothing
further, that's what they did.
II.
My guess is that most people will have some doubts about
whether Mrs. Jones's ultimate decision was autonomous. Before we
explore these doubts, however, we should consider a prior set of
circumstances that seems to represent a paradox for the autonomy
view.
Mrs. Jones did not want to be autonomous in the way that the
autonomy view contemplates. She asked me to make the decision
for her. She would have been immensely relieved if I had told her
without explanation what she should have done, and she would have
done it.
Now most people recognize that a commitment to individual
autonomy requires the condemnation of some specific individual
choices that, however seemingly autonomous in themselves, would
preclude capacity for further autonomous choice. Choosing to sell
yourself into slavery is the classic example. So long as these choices
seem crazy or highly unusual, the contradiction they pose for the
commitment to autonomy is not that serious.
However, I don't think Mrs. Jones's desire for an "escape from
freedom" was crazy or highly unusual. Decisionmaking of this kind
involves anxiety. Moreover, some people may reasonably believe
that they are not very good at it. In such circumstances, the opportunity to put your fate in the hands of an apparently benevolent expert may seem attractive.
I've had experiences of this kind. For example, I recall our pediatrician advising my wife and me as to whether we should have our
then two-month-old son vaccinated against whooping cough, several cases of which had occurred in our area. There was a specified
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small probability of an adverse reaction to the vaccine, and given an
adverse reaction, a specified small probability of death, and specified small probabilities of less extreme bad outcomes. Without the
shot, there was a specified small probability of contracting the disease, a specified small probability given contraction of death, and
specified small probabilities of various bad results short of death. I
found this explanation, which went on for several minutes, overwhelmingly oppressive, and I felt a sense of deliverance when she
concluded by saying, "In the case of my own child, I decided to give
him the shot." I felt, and still do, that that sentence was all that I
needed or wanted to know.
Such attitudes pose a dilemma for the autonomy view. In the
legal context, the lawyer must either acquiesce in the client's choice
to put her fate in the lawyer's hands or "force her to be free" by
denying her the advice that she considers most valuable. Neither
seems consistent with the mainstream idea of autonomy.
In Mrs. Jones's case, I think I was right not to permit her to
delegate the decision to me at the outset. I correctly doubted my
legal competence in the relevant area, and I didn't know Mrs. Jones
very well. (In both respects, my relation to our pediatrician at the
time of the vaccination decision was different.) Thus, it was a good
idea both to try to involve her in the decision and to learn more
about her. But I don't see this conclusion as distinctively supported
by respect for Mrs. Jones's autonomy. It was contrary to her expressed wishes, and it did not and probably could not have made it
possible for her to make a genuinely autonomous subsequent decision. My decision to withhold my views could be supported as well
by saying that it was not in Mrs. Jones's best interests for her to
delegate the decision to someone as ignorant about both the law
and her as I was then.
III.
The decision Mrs. Jones ultimately made, as I described it
before, illustrates a point that is now widely acknowledged. Even
where they think of themselves as merely providing information for
clients to integrate into their own decisions, lawyers influence clients by myriad judgments, conscious or not, about what information
to present, how to order it, what to emphasize, and what style and
phrasing to adopt.2 As you probably surmised from the way I told
the story, I think Mrs. Jones's initial decision not to accept the plea
2. See, e.g., Elimann, supra note 1, at 733-53.
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bargain was influenced by the facts that I went over the disadvantages of the plea bargain last, that I concluded by saying, "It
wouldn't be total justice," and that my tone and facial expressions
implied that justice should have been a decisive consideration for
her. I think her ultimate decision was influenced by the facts that
my friend discussed the advantages of the plea bargain last, went
over the jail possibility at more length, omitted any reference tojustice, and implied by his manner that he thought she should accept
the bargain.
Proponents of the autonomy view are likely to respond that the
problem illustrated by Mrs. Jones's case is not the implausibility of
the autonomy ideal, but the failure to competently implement it on
the part of her lawyers. They would suggest that the discussion was
too hurried and pressured and the advice was less informative and
neutral than it should have been. Although such criticisms have
substance, they tend to underestimate some intractable problems.
Time is scarce in nearly all practice situations, and the difficulties of
framing unbiased advice are often overwhelming.
As an illustration of these problems, consider two specific issues
in counseling Mrs. Jones. My friend and I made clear to her that
there was a theoretical possibility of ajail term if she were convicted,
even though we both thought this probability tiny, and this knowledge visibly evoked anxiety and fear in Mrs. Jones. At the same
time, we never discussed with her the possibility that we might defend on the ground that the prosecution was racially discriminatory.
Most practicing lawyers would probably approve our conduct.
Such judgments are based on assumptions that lawyers necessarily
rely on all the time about what a client's goals are likely to be. Most
lawyers would assume that even a small probability of jail would be
important to most clients, and that in a case with strong conventional defenses, a defense with little probability of success and a
strong potential for alienating the judge would be of little importance to most clients. The compatibility of such assumptions with
the autonomy view depends on the extent to which the assumptions
accurately reflect client ends. My own impression is that they are
often inaccurate or too crude to serve as reliable guides. For example, in Mrs. Jones's case I think conventional assumptions about the
jail penalty and the discrimination defense are wrong.
Going to jail would have been a disastrous outcome for Mrs.
Jones. However, it was also a very unlikely outcome. As a purely
cognitive matter, most people have difficulty rationally (that is, consistently) making decisions about risks. Where the decision involves
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an outcome that evokes strong emotions and vivid images, the difficulty is compounded.' And, of course, where the circumstances in
which the decision must be made involve strain and discomfort, the
difficulty is further compounded. Such factors account in part for
my feeling that it was not helpful to me in deciding about my son's
whooping cough vaccination to hear about the probability that he
might die from it or from not having it.
I once met a client who had received a notice from the welfare
department accusing her-more or less accurately-of some smalltime fraud. She sobbed and fidgeted uncontrollably and couldn't
focus on my questions or tell a coherent story. After a few minutes
she said, "Please tell me there's no chance I could go to jail." I
replied, "There is no chance you could go to jail," and she relaxed
and achieved some composure. My statement was inaccurate in two
respects: first, it implied that I had a professionally adequate basis
for such an opinion, when in fact I did not know either what the law
said or what the relevant official practices were; and second, there
was in fact a chance, albeit a small one, that she could have gone to
jail. I did not qualify or correct the statement when I learned more.
Had I done so, I don't think she would have been able to focus on
anything else or to achieve enough composure or confidence to engage in anything that could plausibly be called decisionmaking.
In Mrs. Jones's case, I think my friend and I should have either
omitted mention ofjail entirely or characterized it in the way I did to
the welfare client. Mrs. Jones was a considerably more self-possessed woman; she was intelligent, and her anxiety was no greater
than I'd guess the median person's would be in her situation. Still, I
think she was bound to be disabled by any description of jail as a
real, even if small, possibility.
What about the option of the race discrimination defense? This
defense is almost impossible to establish, and we had no evidence
for it other than Mrs. Jones's testimony of some vaguely racist police
3. Behavioral psychologists have found that the vividness of a possible disastrous
outcome may impede people from appropriately discounting it for the probability of its
occurrence. Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived
Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463, 465-66, 485-87
(D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds. 1982). Thus, it has been suggested that it is
difficult to educate people about risks such as nuclear power plant failures because "any
discussion of nuclear accidents may increase their imaginability and hence their perceived risk." Id. at 487.
The psychological literature surveyed in the Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky book
has numerous applications to situations such as Mrs. Jones's case, but since it would take
a separate essay to do justice to them, I forego exploring them here.
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statements and the fact that the police had insisted on prosecution
after the other driver had withdrawn her complaint. The probability
that the client, when fully informed, would want to proceed with the
defense, seems low. It would consume a lot of scarce time to fully
discuss this option. Moreover, there's some danger that the client
wouldn't fully understand the situation, and would choose the defense without appreciating its disadvantages.
Some such reasoning probably underlies the general practice of
criminal defense lawyers of encouraging novice defendants to plead
not guilty at arraignment without discussing the possibility that
there might be moral, expiatory reasons why a defendant might wish
to confess guilt even at the cost of making her strategic position
more vulnerable. A small number of clients might, when fully informed, decide to plead guilty for such reasons, but lawyers do not
explore that possibility in part for fear of wasting the time of or confusing the others.
I don't find such reasoning entirely convincing in Mrs. Jones's
case. Mrs. Jones's chances of success on the discrimination claim
were no less than her chances of going to jail. She clearly thought
she was the victim of official racism. An acquittal would not have
specifically vindicated this dimension of her grievance. The opportunity to bear witness in public to the grievance, even if it were not
officially vindicated, might have been of some value to her.
In any event, the reasons that lawyers seem to find adequate for
not mentioning the racism defense are hard to distinguish from the
reasons they seem to find inadequate for not mentioning the jail
penalty. The lawyers' tendency to attach more importance to the
prescribed penalty than to the defense seems to arise at least in part
from influences other than understanding of clients. One such influence is the positivist strain of professional legal culture that tends
to privilege specific statutory language over common-law or constitutional principle and material over nonmaterial consequences. Another such influence is a risk aversion of the lawyer that may give
priority to avoiding the possibility of disappointing the client (and
even provoking malpractice claims) over achieving some benefit that
the client does not anticipate. By letting the client assume that
there's no way to raise the race discrimination claim, the lawyer
eliminates the risk that the client will blame him if the claim is asserted and fails.
IV.
I should now acknowledge a point that often concerns people
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about Mrs. Jones's case. Mrs. Jones was elderly, female, black, and
of modest means; my friend and I were none of these. She probably
had a vast lifelong experience of subordination and marginalization
of kinds that we knew only through imagination. In these circumstances, the dangers were great that we would fail accurately to understand her, that we would compound her oppression by
interpreting her in terms of inappropriate assumptions conditioned
by the dominant culture.
Indeed, ever since I entered Mrs. Jones's plea, I have believed
that my friend succumbed to just such dangers: class and race prejudice inclined him to see avoiding sanctions as the only thing Mrs.

Jones really cared about. On the other hand, even as I have
reproached myself for deferring to my friend, I have flattered myself
that I appreciated Mrs. Jones's sense of dignity and the likely importance to her of vindication by acquittal.
However, several friends who read earlier drafts of this Essay
have persuaded me that I failed to consider adequately the possibility that my own views were conditioned by prejudice. Perhaps I was

just smugly attributing my own liberal upper-class moralism to her.
I never considered how the fact that I had no reason at all to fear the
kind of risks facing Mrs. Jones, might lead me to overly discount
them and how my generally more satisfying experience with official

institutions might lead me to overvalue official vindication.4
Now that I have considered these possibilities, I still think my
original interpretation was right. (I just can't see Mrs. Jones's moralism as a projection of my own. I had lots of observations to support my interpretation. After all, the only initiative she took in the
whole relation was to bring her minister with her to testify to her
character.) But I have considerably less confidence in my judgment
about Mrs. Jones than I used to have, and I recognize that in more
ambiguous situations the dangers of misinterpretation would be
very high.
Such observations might lead some to conclude that lawyers
like me are so ill-equipped to understand clients as socially distant
as Mrs. Jones that it would be better if we didn't try. Or that we are
likely to do more harm than good if we challenge the client's initially
articulated choice or if we tell the client what we think the better
choice would be. Perhaps, for example, the effort to empathize and
4. Lucie White's stunning account of a welfare hearing illustrates a lawyer misinterpretation of a client similar to the one hypothesized in the text. See White, Subordination,
Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes. Notes on the Hearingof Mrs. G., 38 BUFFALO L.
REV. 1, 19-52 (1990).
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establish rapport with a client like Mrs. Jones threatens to unleash in
the lawyer unconscious feelings of prejudice that are more likely to
be held in check when the relation remains more formal and emotionally sterile.' Perhaps such an effort threatens to induce in the
client an inappropriate trust and dependence.
I don't agree with these views, at least when put categorically. I
think they underestimate the capacity of people to empathize across
social distance (though I agree this requires training and effort).
Moreover, social distance from the client is not entirely a disadvantage; we associate distance with detachment as well as alienation. A
lawyer socially closer to Mrs. Jones might have been less conscious
of the distance that remained and more ready to attribute his own
values to her than I was.
Even if I am wrong about this point, however, I don't think it
affects my principal argument. The point that establishing empathy
and rapport can be dangerous is not an argument against paternalism or for autonomy. Empathy and rapport are no less important
for autonomy than for paternalism. If at all plausible, the judgment
that the lawyer should not strive for empathy and rapport will be
based in part on an assessment of whether the outcomes associated
with such an effort are, on balance, in clients' best interests.
V.
Let's consider some descriptions of the contrasting approaches
to counseling in the autonomy and paternalist views. Begin with a
crude but nevertheless influential version of the autonomy view: the
lawyer's job is to present to the client, within time and resource constraints, the information relevant to the decision at hand. The lawyer discharges her function when this information has been
presented, and whatever decision the client then articulates is
deemed autonomous.
This crude formulation is unworkable and implausible. It is unworkable because it does not provide any criteria of relevance, and
because it ignores that the most obvious criteria-the client's goals
and values-are not immediately accessible to the lawyer. It is implausible because it measures autonomy simply in terms of the information the lawyer presents without regard to whether the way
5. Cf. Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee & Hubbert, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the
Risk of Preudicein Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1370 (arguing that formal procedures that create role distance between professionals and subordinated people
desirably inhibit the influence of prejudice on the professionals).
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she presents it influences the decision or whether the client is emotionally or cognitively able to make effective use of the information.
On the crude autonomy view, my pediatrician could have fully discharged her duty by telling me the probabilities associated with the
vaccination decision even though I felt unable to make any use of
this information.
Thoughtful autonomy proponents do not argue for this crude
view. In their refined version, the lawyer's duty is to present the
information a typical person in the client's situation would consider
relevant except to the extent the lawyer has reason to believe that
the particular client would consider different information relevant,
in which case she is to present that information. The lawyer has to
start by imputing the goals of a typical client to the actual client
because before she knows the client she has no other basis for
understanding.
But in this refined autonomy view the lawyer has a duty both to
educate herself about the particular client's concerns and to assist
the client in making use of the information the lawyer provides.6
Here the client's autonomy is as much a goal as a premise of the
counseling relation.7 The refined view contemplates a dialogue in
which the lawyer adjusts her presentation as she learns more about
the client's concerns and abilities and in which she is as much concerned with relieving the client's disabling anxieties and enhancing
her cognitive capacities as she is with simply delivering information.
Now consider the paternalist view-first in a crude version. In
this view, the lawyer simply consults her own values; she asks what
she would do in the client's circumstances or what she thinks a person with some general characteristic of the client should do and
tries to influence the client to adopt that course.
Two versions of more refined paternalist views are associated
with the University of Maryland School of Law. David Luban has
argued that paternalist coercion is justified when, among other conditions, the client's articulated goal fails to meet a minimal test of
objective reasonableness. 8 On the other hand, in his Sobeloff Lecture, Duncan Kennedy argued for paternalistic coercion on the basis

6. See, e.g., Ellmann, supra note 1.; D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 1.
7. For an elaboration of this idea in a related context, see Simon, The Invention and
Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REV. 1, 16-23 (1985). Gerald L6pez illustrates in
detail a style of practice that seems appropriate to this idea. See Lopez, Reconceiving Civil
Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration,77 GEo. LJ. 1603 (1989).
8. Luban, supra note 1, at 474-92.
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of "lived intersubjectivity." 9 He justified paternalism where the actor was convinced that the subject's articulated choice did not truly
express his identity, for example, because of fear and depression.
In contrast to Luban's, Kennedy's approach is triggered by a
concrete sense of the particular subject. Here the paternalist judgment does not hold the subject to an external standard such as reasonableness, but holds him to an interpretation of the subject's own
projects and commitments. The paternalist works for the choice
that seems most consistent with her understanding of who the client
is. When she disregards the client's articulated choice, she has concluded that the client has misunderstood either himself or how the
options relate to his deeper goals. The Luban and Kennedy approaches are not incompatible, and the refined view should make
room for them both.
The two aspects of the refined paternalist view can be readily
applied to Mrs. Jones's case. The concerns about Mrs. Jones's request for me to make the decision for her seem to resonate with
Luban's perspective. It wasn't reasonable for her to want to put her
fate in the hands of someone as inexperienced and ignorant as me.
On the other hand, the concerns about her ultimate decision seem
to resonate with the Kennedy perspective. There's nothing unreasonable in any general sense about the decision to accept the plea
bargain. It would be the right choice for many people-for example, for someone with no strong sense of dignity, with no respect for
authoritative public pronouncements, and with no tolerance for
conflict or the stress of self-presentation in public. But Mrs. Jones
seemed to be a different person. There's at least a suspicion that I
let her make the wrong choice, given who she was.
My claim is that, once we get beyond the crude versions, it is
hard to distinguish the autonomy and paternalist views. Each refined view contemplates a dialogue with the client that it recognizes
is both essential to understanding the client and fraught with dangers of oppressing or misunderstanding him. Each refined view involves a dialectic of objective constructs (the "typical client"
presumption or the minimal reasonableness test) and efforts to
know the client as a concrete subject. The paternalist view is intensely individualistic to the extent that it aspires to deep knowledge
of the client as a concrete individual and grounds the lawyer's decision in the client's self-realization. Even where it disregards client
choices because they fail the minimum reasonableness test, it is not
9. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 638.
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denying the value of autonomy, just that the particular client has the
capacity for autonomous choice. Conversely, the refined autonomy
view is quite collectivist to the extent that it licenses the application
of objective "typical" client presumptions to the particular client.
And to the extent that it differs from the paternalist view in failing to
apply a minimum reasonableness test, that difference, though perhaps defensible on other grounds, is not plausibly grounded in the
value of autonomy, since that value presupposes a capacity for rational choice.
David Luban suggests that the defining and problematical feature of paternalism is its commitment to particular "conceptions[s]
of the good life."' ° But the most notable theory of "the good" to
come out of the law schools in recent years defines the good in
terms of the "choices" people make when not under "domination."" This sounds very much like a theory of autonomous choice.
A genuine conflict between autonomy and paternalism would
require a view that contained both a thick theory of the good that
did not depend on individual choice and a notion of individual
choice capable of envisioning choices that violate the good as autonomous. It is not hard to find examples of such views-for example,
in most versions of Christianity and other scriptural religions-but
they seem to have little direct influence within the legal profession.
If the debate between the autonomy and paternalist views is so
often moot, why does it inspire so much energy and emotion? My
guess is that the debate expresses the anxiety that lawyers, especially
those who represent clients socially distant from themselves, feel
about getting to know their clients and about assuming responsibility for them. The process of learning to understand and communicate with a stranger is usually difficult and often scary. Moreover, as
I've emphasized, in this process the lawyer inescapably exercises
power over the client. The issues that have to be decided are tremendously difficult, and the stakes are often very high. In these circumstances, lawyers often find the demands of connecting with the
client and the responsibilities of power emotionally overwhelming.
The crude autonomy view is attractive to lawyers because it absolves them of the burdens of connection and the responsibilities of
power by suggesting that they can perform their duties simply by
presenting a professionally defined package of information. Both
the crude and the refined paternalist views are frightening because
10. Luban, supra note 1, at 464.
11. R.M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLmcs 242-46 (1975).
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both emphasize the inescapability of lawyer power, and the latter
emphasizes as well the duty to connect with the client. So of course
does the refined autonomy view, but perhaps the rhetorical association of the refined autonomy view with the crude one evokes some
of the psychologically comforting associations of the latter and
makes it more palatable than refined paternalism, even when they
are functionally indistinguishable.
VI.

CONCLUSION

I don't claim that we can never plausibly conceive of a meaningfully autonomous choice that is not in the chooser's best interests.
But I would argue, at least, that there is a large category of cases
involving legal decisions, where, given the circumstances in which
the decisions must be made, we have no criteria of autonomy entirely independent of our criteria of best interests. Many of the best
reasons we have for thinking that Mrs. Jones's choice was not autonomous are the reasons we have for thinking that it was not in her
best interests.

